電腦科學會議應要求不可否認的實驗結果

摘要

本立場論文主張，計算機科學會議應要求提供具防篡改且不可否認的實驗結果證明。我們將此根本問題命名為「實驗不可否認性」：一套合規協議必須將論文中的數據與實際執行的計算緊密綁定，使作者事後無法篡改或否認。現行體系依賴於自我申報檢查清單、選擇性程式碼共享以及作者控制的日誌紀錄，但這些機制均無法回答審稿人無法親自驗證的問題：論文所述程式碼是否確實產出了報告中的數字？我們正式定義此問題，闡明任何合規協議必須滿足的安全屬性，並描述當前方法未能防範的威脅模型。為證明該問題可解，我們以 Go 語言實作了參考系統 K-Veritas，該系統無需存取訓練資料即可產出簽署報告。K-Veritas 僅為測試平台，並非最終解答。我們呼籲各會議及學術社群將不可否認性視為首要要求，並協力建立開放、獨立的標準。

English

This position paper argues that computer science conferences should require tamper-evident, nonrepudiable attestations of experimental results. We name the underlying problem experiment nonrepudiation: a compliant protocol must bind the numbers in a paper to an actual executed computation in a way the author cannot later alter or deny. The current system relies on self-reported checklists, optional code sharing, and author-controlled logging. None of these mechanisms answer the question a reviewer cannot check: did the code the paper describes produce the numbers the paper reports? We define the problem formally, state the security properties any compliant protocol must satisfy, and describe a threat model that includes attacks current approaches do not prevent. To show that the problem is solvable, we built K-Veritas, a reference implementation in Go that produces signed reports without accessing training data. K-Veritas is a testbed, not a finished answer. We call on conferences and the community to treat nonrepudiation as a first-class requirement and to help build an open, independent standard for it.