计算机科学会议应该要求不可否认的实验结果

摘要

本立场文件主张，计算机科学会议应要求提供防篡改、不可抵赖的实验结果证明。我们将这一基础问题称为"实验不可抵赖性"：合规协议必须将论文中的数值与实际执行的运算绑定，使得作者事后无法修改或否认。当前系统依赖自我报告清单、可选代码共享以及作者控制的日志记录，但这些机制均无法回答审稿人无法核查的问题：论文所描述的代码是否真的产生了论文所报告的数据？我们对该问题进行了形式化定义，阐述了任何合规协议必须满足的安全属性，并描述了一个包含当前方法未能防范的攻击的威胁模型。为证明该问题的可解决性，我们构建了K-Veritas——一个用Go语言实现、无需访问训练数据即可生成签名报告的原型系统。K-Veritas是测试平台而非最终答案。我们呼吁各会议及社区将不可抵赖性视为首要需求，并共同为其构建开放、独立的标准。

English

This position paper argues that computer science conferences should require tamper-evident, nonrepudiable attestations of experimental results. We name the underlying problem experiment nonrepudiation: a compliant protocol must bind the numbers in a paper to an actual executed computation in a way the author cannot later alter or deny. The current system relies on self-reported checklists, optional code sharing, and author-controlled logging. None of these mechanisms answer the question a reviewer cannot check: did the code the paper describes produce the numbers the paper reports? We define the problem formally, state the security properties any compliant protocol must satisfy, and describe a threat model that includes attacks current approaches do not prevent. To show that the problem is solvable, we built K-Veritas, a reference implementation in Go that produces signed reports without accessing training data. K-Veritas is a testbed, not a finished answer. We call on conferences and the community to treat nonrepudiation as a first-class requirement and to help build an open, independent standard for it.