隨機演化博弈中多態性的湧現

摘要

确定性进化博弈论无法区分以下两种情况：一是所有个体均共享一种混合进化稳定策略的单态群体，二是纯策略玩家以某种比例共存从而在平均意义上复现该混合策略的多态群体。所谓的颤抖手假说认为，在有限群体中，人口噪声会促使群体向单态演化，然而模拟研究在某些情况下发现了相互矛盾的结果。本文通过时间尺度分离对经典的鹰鸽博弈进行理论分析，以解决这一矛盾。我们刻画了由随机效应驱动的多态性涌现现象，并发现某些条件下存在持久的多态状态。

English

Deterministic evolutionary game theory makes no distinction between a monomorphic population of individuals all of whom share a mixed evolutionarily stable strategy and a polymorphic population of players of pure strategies present in a ratio that reproduces the mixed strategy on average. The so-called trembling hand hypothesis posits that in finite populations demographic noise selects for monomorphism, however, simulation studies have found contradictory results in some situations. Here we resolve this discrepancy by conducting a theoretical analysis of the paradigmatic Hawk-Dove game using timescale separation. We characterise the emergence of polymorphism driven by stochastic effects, finding long-lasting polymorphic states in certain conditions.

隨機演化博弈中多態性的湧現

Emergence of polymorphism in stochastic evolutionary games

摘要

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