随机进化博弈中多态性的涌现

摘要

确定性进化博弈论不区分两种情形：一种是由全体个体共享混合进化稳定策略的单态种群，另一种是由纯策略玩家按比例构成的多态种群，该比例在平均意义上复现了混合策略。所谓的“颤抖手假说”认为，在有限种群中，人口噪声倾向于选择单态性，然而模拟研究在某些情况下发现了相互矛盾的结果。本文通过利用时间尺度分离对经典的鹰鸽博弈进行理论分析，解决了这一分歧。我们刻画了由随机效应驱动的多态性涌现，并在特定条件下发现了持久的多态状态。

English

Deterministic evolutionary game theory makes no distinction between a monomorphic population of individuals all of whom share a mixed evolutionarily stable strategy and a polymorphic population of players of pure strategies present in a ratio that reproduces the mixed strategy on average. The so-called trembling hand hypothesis posits that in finite populations demographic noise selects for monomorphism, however, simulation studies have found contradictory results in some situations. Here we resolve this discrepancy by conducting a theoretical analysis of the paradigmatic Hawk-Dove game using timescale separation. We characterise the emergence of polymorphism driven by stochastic effects, finding long-lasting polymorphic states in certain conditions.

随机进化博弈中多态性的涌现

Emergence of polymorphism in stochastic evolutionary games

摘要

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