毒蘋果效應：AI代理技術擴張對中介市場的策略性操控

摘要

人工智慧代理融入經濟市場，從根本上改變了策略互動的格局。我們在三種經典賽局理論情境中，探討技術選擇擴張對經濟的影響：議價（資源分配）、談判（非對稱資訊交易）與說服（策略性資訊傳遞）。研究發現，僅是增加人工智慧代理的選擇，就足以大幅改變均衡收益與監管結果，往往會激勵監管機構主動開發並發布技術。相反地，我們也發現名為「毒蘋果」效應的策略現象：行為者可能發布一項新技術，但最終自身與對手皆未採用，其目的純粹是為了操控監管機構選擇對自身有利的市場設計。這種策略性發布行為以犧牲對手利益與監管公平性目標為代價，提升發布者的福祉。我們的研究結果表明，靜態監管框架易受技術擴張的操縱，因此需要動態市場設計來適應人工智慧能力不斷演進的格局。

English

The integration of AI agents into economic markets fundamentally alters the landscape of strategic interaction. We investigate the economic implications of expanding the set of available technologies in three canonical game-theoretic settings: bargaining (resource division), negotiation (asymmetric information trade), and persuasion (strategic information transmission). We find that simply increasing the choice of AI delegates can drastically shift equilibrium payoffs and regulatory outcomes, often creating incentives for regulators to proactively develop and release technologies. Conversely, we identify a strategic phenomenon termed the "Poisoned Apple" effect: an agent may release a new technology, which neither they nor their opponent ultimately uses, solely to manipulate the regulator's choice of market design in their favor. This strategic release improves the releaser's welfare at the expense of their opponent and the regulator's fairness objectives. Our findings demonstrate that static regulatory frameworks are vulnerable to manipulation via technology expansion, necessitating dynamic market designs that adapt to the evolving landscape of AI capabilities.

毒蘋果效應：AI代理技術擴張對中介市場的策略性操控

The Poisoned Apple Effect: Strategic Manipulation of Mediated Markets via Technology Expansion of AI Agents

摘要

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