《毒苹果效应：AI智能体技术扩张对中介市场的战略操控》

摘要

人工智能代理融入经济市场，从根本上改变了战略互动的格局。我们通过三个经典博弈论场景——议价（资源分配）、谈判（非对称信息交易）和劝说（策略性信息传递），研究了技术选择范围扩展对经济的影响。研究发现，仅增加AI代理的选择就足以显著改变均衡收益与监管结果，往往激励监管机构主动研发并发布新技术。相反，我们识别出名为"毒苹果效应"的策略现象：行为者可能发布一项新技术（其自身与对手最终皆不采用），仅为了操纵监管机构作出有利于己方的市场设计选择。这种策略性发布以牺牲对手利益和监管公平目标为代价，提升了发布者的福利水平。我们的研究结果表明，静态监管框架易受技术扩张的操纵，亟需建立能适应AI能力演进的动态市场设计机制。

English

The integration of AI agents into economic markets fundamentally alters the landscape of strategic interaction. We investigate the economic implications of expanding the set of available technologies in three canonical game-theoretic settings: bargaining (resource division), negotiation (asymmetric information trade), and persuasion (strategic information transmission). We find that simply increasing the choice of AI delegates can drastically shift equilibrium payoffs and regulatory outcomes, often creating incentives for regulators to proactively develop and release technologies. Conversely, we identify a strategic phenomenon termed the "Poisoned Apple" effect: an agent may release a new technology, which neither they nor their opponent ultimately uses, solely to manipulate the regulator's choice of market design in their favor. This strategic release improves the releaser's welfare at the expense of their opponent and the regulator's fairness objectives. Our findings demonstrate that static regulatory frameworks are vulnerable to manipulation via technology expansion, necessitating dynamic market designs that adapt to the evolving landscape of AI capabilities.

《毒苹果效应：AI智能体技术扩张对中介市场的战略操控》

The Poisoned Apple Effect: Strategic Manipulation of Mediated Markets via Technology Expansion of AI Agents

摘要

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